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Administrative Law
by Chelsea M. Lamb *
Moses Tincher **
and Matthew M. White***
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article surveys cases from the Georgia Supreme Court and the
Georgia Court of Appeals from June 1, 2019, through May 31, 2020, in
which principles of administrative law were a central focus of the case. 1
Exhaustion of remedies will be the first topic discussed, followed by a
review of decisions by administrative agencies, followed by cases
discusses administrative scope of authority, with statutory construction
to follow. The Article will conclude with cases discussing the standard
of review of decisions by administrative agencies.
II. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
In Amazing Amusements Group, Inc. v. Wilson, 2 the Georgia Court of
Appeals held O.C.G.A. § 50-27-76(a) 3 did not permit Amazing
Amusements Group, Inc. (AAG) to bypass administrative exhaustion
requirements before seeking judicial review of the Georgia Lottery
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1 For an analysis of administrative law during the prior survey period, see Alan
Gregory Poole, Jr. & Chelsea M. Lamb, Administrative Law, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 71 MERCER L. REV. 1 (2019).
2 353 Ga. App. 256, 835 S.E.2d 781 (2019).
3 O.C.G.A. § 50-27-76(a) (2019).
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Corporation’s (GLC) decision. 4 AAG held a master license issued by the
GLC, which provided AAG with a license to lease coin operated
amusement machines (COAMs) to licensed retail businesses. 5 In 2016,
the GLC issued a citation to AAG alleging violations of GLC’s rules,
which AAG contested. Thereafter, a hearing officer conducted a
three-day evidentiary hearing with both parties present and
represented by counsel. The hearing officer considered the evidence
presented and issued a twenty-seven page “Executive Order” listing his
findings, analysis, and conclusions. The Executive Order revoked AAG’s
master license for ten years, revoked any other business licenses, and
fined AAG $75,000. 6 Rather than pursue an appeal of the hearing
officer’s decision available under GLC Rule 13.2.1, 7 AAG filed a petition
in the Superior Court of Fulton County seeking a writ of certiorari
under O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1 8 and judicial review under O.C.G.A.
§ 50-27-76(a), 9 and the GLC filed a motion to dismiss the petition. 10 The
superior court granted the GLC’s motion to dismiss and denied AAG’s
motion for reconsideration. AAG then sought discretionary review with
the court of appeals, which was granted. 11
On appeal, AAG argued that based on the language of O.C.G.A.
§ 50-27-76(a) any and all actions by the GLC or its Chief Executive
Officer are appealable to the superior court at any time, regardless of
whether the decision was appealed at the agency level. 12 The GLC’s
rules state that “[a] party must follow the intra-agency appeal
procedure as outlined in this Rule. The failure of a party to follow such
appeal procedure shall constitute a waiver of its appeal rights.” 13 On
the other hand, O.C.G.A. § 50-27-76(a) provides that an “[a]ppeal by an
affected person from all actions of the [GLC] or chief executive officer
shall be to the Superior Court of Fulton County. The review shall be
conducted by the court and shall be confined to the record.” 14 AAG
Amazing Amusements Group, Inc., 353 Ga. App. at 256–57, 835 S.E.2d at 782.
Id. at 256, 835 S.E.2d at 783.
6 Id. at 256–57, 835 S.E.2d at 783.
7 Georgia Lottery Commission Coin Operated Amusement Machines, GLC Rule 13.2.1,
https://www.gacoam.com/API/Documents/Document?documentID=191#:~:text=RU%2013.
2.1%20APPLICABILITY&text=(2)%20Administrative%20hearings%20will%20be,a%20re
asonable%20period%20of%20time. (last visited September 23, 2020).
8 O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1 (2019).
9 O.C.G.A. § 50-27-76(a) (2019).
10 Amazing Amusements Group, Inc., 353 Ga. App. at 257, 835 S.E.2d at 783.
11 Id. at 257, 835 S.E.2d at 783.
12 Id. at 258, 835 S.E.2d at 783–84; O.C.G.A. § 50-27-76(a) (2019).
13 Amazing Amusements Group, Inc., 353 Ga. App. at 259, 835 S.E.2d at 784 (quoting
GLC Rule 13.2.5.)
14 O.C.G.A. § 50-27-76(a) (2019).
4
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contended that “all actions” should be read in the broadest sense,
regardless if the action is final, temporary, pending, or otherwise, and
thus, AAG did not have to engage in the appeal process required by the
GLC’s rules. 15 AAG reasoned that because the language in the GLC’s
rules conflicted with the statutory language of O.C.G.A. § 50-27-76(a),
the GLC’s rules must yield to the statutory language. 16 The Supreme
Court of Georgia, however, disagreed and held that AAG failed to
exhaust its administrative remedies as required by the GLC’s rules. 17
In reviewing the GLC’s rules and the statutory language, the
supreme court noted that because “all actions” is not defined by the
statute, the court must “presume the statute was enacted by the
legislation with full knowledge of existing condition of the law.” 18 The
legislature authorized the GLC to establish the intra-agency appeal
process and did not limit the exclusivity of the administrative remedy. 19
In addition, the supreme court determined that reading O.C.G.A.
§ 50-27-76 in the manner AAG requested would render meaningless
other statutes applicable to the GLC’s authority and the process for
aggrieved parties to challenge certain GLC actions. 20 Thus, the supreme
court held the phrase “all actions” must be read in conjunction with “the
statutory provisions that authorize parties to challenge GLC actions
and the statutory provisions that authorize the GLC to establish an
appeal process for those.” 21 Moreover, the supreme court stated that
this determination upholds long-standing Georgia law that requires
parties aggrieved by a state agency’s decision to raise all issues before
the agency and exhaust all available administrative remedies. 22
“[B]ecause AAG failed to exhaust the required administrative remedies
available to it,” the supreme court upheld the superior court’s dismissal
of AAG’s petition for review. 23
In Amusement Leasing, Inc. v. Georgia Lottery Corporation, 24 the
Georgia Court of Appeals held Amusement Leasing, Inc. (Amusement
Leasing) could directly appeal the trial court’s dismissal of a petition for
review of the GLC’s decision, but Amusement Leasing failed to exhaust

Amazing Amusements Group, Inc., 353 Ga. App. at 258, 835 S.E.2d at 784.
Id. at 260, 835 S.E.2d at 784–85.
17 Id. at 263, 835 S.E.2d at 787.
18 Id. at 260, 835 S.E2d at 785 (quoting City of Atlanta v. City of College Park, 292 Ga.
741, 744, 741 S.E.2d 147 (2013)).
19 Id. at 261, 835 S.E.2d at 785–86.
20 Id. at 262, 835 S.E.2d at 786.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 263, 835 S.E.2d at 787.
24 352 Ga. App. 243, 834 S.E.2d 330 (2019).
15
16
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administrative remedies. 25 Amusement Leasing held a master license
issued by the GLC to operate COAMs in Georgia. In 2016, the GLC
issued three citations to Amusement Leasing for violations of the GLC’s
rules and COAM laws, which Amusement Leasing contested.
Thereafter, a GLC-appointed hearing officer conducted an evidentiary
hearing. The hearing officer issued an executive order finding
Amusement Leasing violated the GLC’s rules and COAM laws,
revoking Amusement Leasing’s master license, and fining Amusement
leasing $10,000. Amusement Leasing filed a timely request for
reconsideration with the hearing officer. The hearing officer issued a
“Reconsideration Order,” denying the request. Over a year after
receiving the Reconsideration Order, Amusement Leasing filed an
untimely motion for review with the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of
the GLC. The motion for review was ultimately deemed denied under
the GLC rules. 26 After this denial, Amusement Leasing filed a petition
for judicial review in the Superior Court of Fulton County, arguing in
part that the GLC erred in revoking its master license. The superior
court dismissed Amusement Leasing’s petition for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, and Amusement Leasing filed a notice of
appeal from that order to the Georgia Court of Appeals. 27
In response, the GLC filed a motion to dismiss the direct appeal,
arguing Amusement Leasing failed to follow the discretionary
application procedure required by O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a) 28 to obtain
appellate review. 29 O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a) outlines several categories of
trial courts for which an application for discretionary review is
required, including “[a]ppeals from decisions of the superior courts
reviewing decisions of . . . state and local administrative agencies.” 30
The court of appeals dismissed the GLC’s motion, holding Amusement
Leasing was permitted to file a direct appeal from the superior court’s
final order pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34 31 “because the General
Assembly has expressly provided that the GLC is not to be treated as a
state agency.” 32 As such, the GLC’s motion to dismiss the appeal was
denied. 33

Id. at 243–44, 834 S.E.2d at 331.
Id.
27 Id. at 244, 834 S.E.2d at 331–32.
28 O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a) (2019).
29 Amusement Leasing, Inc., 352 Ga. App. at 244–45, 834 S.E.2d at 332.
30 O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1) (2019).
31 O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34 (2019).
32 Amusement Leasing, Inc., 352 Ga. App. at 245, 834 S.E.2d at 332 (citing O.C.G.A.
§ 50-27-4); O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34.
33 Amusement Leasing, Inc., 352 Ga. App. at 247, 834 S.E.2d at 333.
25
26
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Nonetheless, the court of appeals upheld the superior court’s order
and dismissed Amusement Leasing’s appeal for failure to exhaust
available administrative remedies. 34 Under the GLC’s rules, an
aggrieved party seeking relief from a hearing officer’s executive order
“must follow a two-step appeal procedure within the GLC, including
requesting reconsideration from the hearing officer and then moving for
review by the GLC’s CEO.” 35 Failure to follow this procedure within the
applicable timelines provided by the GLC will result in a waiver of
appeal rights. 36 Here, Amusement Leasing filed a timely request for
reconsideration but failed to file a motion for review with the GLC’s
CEO within the ten-day timeframe. Thus, the court of appeals held that
by failing to comply with the mandatory deadline provided by the GLC’s
rule, Amusement Leasing failed to exhaust its available administrative
remedies before seeking review in the superior court. 37
III. REVIEW OF DECISIONS MADE BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
In Cobb Hospital, Inc. v. Georgia Department of Community
Health, 38 the Supreme Court of Georgia held the Georgia Department of
Community Health (DCH) Commissioner was not required to rule on a
constitutional claim in order for the claim to be preserved for appellate
review. 39 In 2016, Emory University Hospital Smyrna (EUHS) applied
with the DCH for a new certificate of need (CON) to undertake
improvements and renovations totaling $33.8 million. 40 Other hospitals,
such as Cobb Hospital, Kennestone Hospital, and Wellstar Kennestone
Hospital (collectively, Wellstar) objected to the application, “arguing
that the application ‘seeks to develop a new hospital’ rather than
reopening and renovating the former Emory-Adventist Hospital.” 41 The
DCH granted EUHS’s application, awarding it a new CON, and, in
accordance with O.C.G.A. § 31-6-44, 42 Wellstar appealed to the
Certificate of Need Appeals Panel. 43 A panel officer affirmed the DCH
decision on the ground that Wellstar’s appeal concerned the scope and
validity of EUHS’s original CON, and the CON Appeals Panel lacked
Id. at 247–48, 834 S.E.2d at 334.
Id. at 247, 834 S.E.2d at 333.
36 Id. at 247, 834 S.E.2d at 334
37 Id.
38 307 Ga. 578, 837 S.E.2d 371 (2020).
39 Id. at 578, 837 S.E.2d at 372.
40 Cobb Hosp. Inc. v. Department of Community Health, 349 Ga. App. 452, 452–53, 825
S.E.2d 886, 887–88 (2019).
41 Id. at 453, 825 S.E.2d at 888.
42 O.C.G.A. § 31-6-44 (2019).
43 Cobb Hosp. Inc., 349 Ga. App. at 453, 825 S.E.2d at 888.
34
35
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the authority to review the determination of the original CON. Wellstar
appealed that decision to the DCH commissioner, arguing in part that
the decision violated Wellstar’s constitutional right to due process. The
DCH commissioner affirmed the panel officer’s decision, and Wellstar
appealed to the Superior Court of Cobb County, who denied the petition
for judicial review. Wellstar then appealed to the Georgia Court of
Appeals. 44
In Division 2 of its opinion, the court of appeals held the
constitutional due process claim enumerated by Wellstar was not
preserved for appellate review because it was not ruled on during the
administrative proceeding that led to the filing of this case in the trial
court. 45 Wellstar petitioned for writ of certiorari, arguing in part that
the court of appeals erred in its holding because it was not ruled on
during the administrative proceeding. 46 The Supreme Court of Georgia
reversed this portion of the court of appeal’s holding, stating that “the
Court of Appeals appears to have confused the requirement that a
constitutional claim be raised during the administrative proceeding to
preserve it for review by the trial court with the separate requirement
that the trial court distinctly rule on the claim to preserve it for review
on appeal.” 47 Because administrative agencies generally have no
authority to rule on constitutional claims, the supreme court held the
court of appeals holding that Wellstar’s constitutional claim was not
preserved because it was not ruled on during the administrative
proceeding was erroneous. 48 Therefore, Wellstar’s writ of certiorari was
granted with regard to the constitutional claim issue, Division 2 of the
court of appeal’s opinion was reserved, and the case was remanded to
the court to reconsider the constitutional claim. 49
In Central Georgia Electric Membership Corp. v. Public Service
Commission, 50 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the superior
court correctly determined the city was entitled to supply electricity to a
new building because the new building was an expansion of existing
premises and thus fell within O.C.G.A. § 46-3-1’s 51 grandfather clause. 52
Since 1989, the City of Jackson (the City) has provided electric service
to Jackson High School, including additional structures that have been
Id. at 453, 825 S.E3d at 888.
Id. at 465, 825 S.E.2d at 895.
46 Cobb Hosp., 307 Ga. at 579, 827 S.E.2d at 373.
47 Id. at 580, 837 S.E.2d at 373.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 580, 837 S.E.2d at 373–74.
50 351 Ga. App. 69, 830 S.E.2d 459 (2019).
51 O.C.G.A. § 46-3-1 (2020).
52 Central Georgia Electric Membership Corp.,351 Ga. App. at 69, 830 S.E.2d at 460.
44
45
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added to the high school, such as trailers. In 2015, the high school built
a new gymnasium next to the high school, and Butts County Board of
Education chose Central Georgia Electric Membership Corporation
(Central Georgia) to provide electric services to the new gym building.
Thereafter, the City filed a petition against Central Georgia with the
Georgia Public Service Commission (PSC) requesting the PSC to issue a
ruling that granted the City the exclusive right to provide electric
service to the new gym building under the Georgia Territorial Electric
Service Act, codified at O.C.G.A. § 46-3-1. After conducting a hearing,
the PCS-appointed hearing officer issued findings of facts and
conclusions of law in an initial decision, concluding that the City, and
not Central Georgia, has the exclusive right to provide electricity to the
new gym building. Central Georgia filed a petition in the Superior
Court of Fulton County seeking a judicial review of the PSC’s decision,
and the superior court affirmed the PSC’s decision. 53 Central Georgia
then filed an appeal with the court of appeals, arguing the PSC erred by
finding the grandfather clause granted the City the right to provide
electric service to the new gym building. 54
Specifically, Central Georgia argued the grandfather clause does not
apply to the new gym building because the clause only grants the right
to continue serving existing buildings or structures. 55 O.C.G.A.
§ 46-3-8(b) 56 states “every electric supplier shall have the exclusive
right to continue serving any premises lawfully served by it.” 57 O.C.G.A.
§ 46-3-3(b) 58 defines the term premises as “the building, structure, or
facility to which electricity is being or is to be furnished, provided that
two or more buildings, structures, or facilities which are located on one
tract or contiguous tracts of land and are utilized by one electric
consumer shall together constitute one premises.” 59 Agreeing with the
hearing officer, the court of appeals held that the grandfather clause
protected “premises,” which includes two or more buildings, structures,
or facilities, and “it does not matter that the [new gym building] is a
separate building.” 60 Because one premises can consist of multiple
buildings, “the grandfather clause can protect a new building if the new
building is an expansion of existing premises already served by an

Id. at 69–71, 830 S.E.2d at 460–61.
Id. at 72, 830 S.E.2d at 462.
55 Id.
56 O.C.G.A. § 46-3-8(b) (2019).
57 Id.
58 O.C.G.A. § 46-3-3(6) (2019).
59 Id.
60 Central Ga. Elec. Membership Corp., 351 Ga. App. at 73, 830 S.E.2d at 462–63.
53
54
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electric supplier.” 61 As such, the court of appeals affirmed the superior
court’s order. 62
IV. SCOPE OF AUTHORITY
In Development Authority of Cobb County v. State, 63 the Georgia
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that
O.C.G.A. § 36-62-2(6)(N) 64 could authorize certain revenue bonds sought
by the Development Authority of Cobb County and that O.C.G.A.
§ 36-62-2(6)(N) did not violate the uniformity provision of the
Development Authorities Clause of the Georgia Constitution. 65 In 2018,
the Development Authority of Cobb County sought to issue $35 million
in revenue bonds under O.C.G.A. § 36-62-2(6)(N) with the goal of
financing a retail development in east Cobb County that would include
construction of a facility suitable for the operation of a grocery store. 66
As part of this plan, the Development Authority of Cobb County would
lease the facility to the Kroger Company, “which would relocate a
nearby grocery store to the newly constructed facility.” 67 However,
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 36-82-77(a), 68 a Cobb County resident objected
to the bonds, which led to the Superior Court of Cobb Court denying
validation of the bonds on the rationale that O.C.G.A. § 36-62-2(6)(N)
did not authorize the bonds and that subparagraph (6)(N) was
unconstitutional. 69
Known as the “catchall provision,” 70 O.C.G.A. § 36-62-2(6)(N)
authorizes development authorities to finance:
The acquisition, construction, installation, modification, renovation,
or rehabilitation of land, interests in land, buildings, structures,
facilities, or other improvements and the acquisition, installation,
modification, renovation, rehabilitation, or furnishing of fixtures,
machinery, equipment, furniture, or other property of any nature
whatsoever used on, in, or in connection with any such land, interest
in land, building, structure, facility, or other improvement, all for the
essential public purpose of the development of trade, commerce,
industry, and employment opportunities. A project may be for any
Id. at 73, 830 S.E.2d at 463.
Id. at 75, 830 S.E.2d at 464.
63 306 Ga. 375, 829 S.E.2d 160 (2019).
64 O.C.G.A. § 36-62-2(6)(N) (2019).
65 Development Authority of Cobb, 306 Ga. at 375, 829 S.E.2d at 160.
66 Id. at 375, 829 S.E.2d at 160.
67 Id.
68 O.C.G.A. § 36-82-77(a) (2019).
69 Development Authority of Cobb at 375–76, 829 S.E.2d at 160–61.
70 Id. at 376, 829 S.E.2d at 161.
61
62
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industrial, commercial, business, office, parking, public, or other use,
provided that a majority of the members of the authority determines,
by a duly adopted resolution, that the project and such use thereof
would further the public purpose of this chapter. 71

Per the court, the superior court provided two reasons for its
conclusion that subparagraph (6)(N) did not authorize the bonds sought
by the Development Authority of Cobb County. 72 First, the superior
court took the position that subparagraph (6)(N) only authorizes a
development authority to finance a project “to the extent that the
project is essential to the development of trade, commerce, industry, and
employment opportunities.” 73 Second, the superior court, citing Haney
v. Development Authority of Bremen, 74 said that the employment
opportunities at the new grocery store were not the sort of “employment
opportunities” with which subparagraph (6)(N) was concerned. 75
In response to these arguments, the Georgia Supreme Court
unequivocally stated that the superior court misunderstood both
subparagraph (6)(N) and Haney. 76 With respect to subparagraph (6)(N),
the court noted that, while the word “essential” appears in
subparagraph (6)(N), “it is used to describe the purposes for which a
development authority may finance projects, not the projects
themselves.” 77 Put differently, “[t]o say that the ‘development of trade,
commerce, industry, and employment opportunities’ is an ‘essential’
purpose of development authorities is not to say that anything financed
by a development authority must be ‘essential’ to such a
development.” 78 In sum, the superior court erred when it concluded that
financing for the project in question was not authorized under
subparagraph (6)(N), because projects themselves need not be
“essential” to “the development of trade, commerce, industry, and
employment opportunities” to be eligible for financing. 79
Looking to the superior court’s reliance on Haney, the supreme court
held that it was error to conclude that Haney implied that additional
employment opportunities at the new grocery store were “not the sort of
‘employment opportunities’ with which subparagraph (6)(N) is

O.C.G.A. § 36-62-2(6)(N) (2019).
Development Authority of Cobb County, 306 Ga. at 376, 829 S.E.2d at 161.
73 Id. at 376, 829 S.E.2d at 161–62 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
74 271 Ga. 403, 519 S.E.2d 665 (1999).
75 Development Authority of Cobb County, 306 Ga. at 376, 829 S.E.2d at 162.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 377, 829 S.E.2d at 162.
78 Id.
79 Id.
71
72
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concerned.” 80 Indeed, the court noted that, while it was unclear what
principle the superior court gleaned from Haney, the case was easily
distinguishable insofar as it stood for the proposition that “‘employment
opportunities’
in
subparagraph
(6)(N)
means
‘employment
opportunities’ resulting directly from the trade, commerce, or industry
that the development authority financed.” 81 Given this and that the
facility at issue was clearly intended for trade and commerce, the court
determined that the employment opportunities at the new grocery store
were “‘opportunities resulting directly from the trade, commerce, or
industry’ that the Development Authority propos[ed] to finance, and,
[therefore, were] ‘employment opportunities’ within the meaning of
subparagraph (6)(N).” 82 In short, the court concluded that “Haney is
nothing like this case” and that the superior court erred in concluding
otherwise. 83
With respect to the superior court’s determination that subparagraph
(6)(N) is unconstitutional, the court noted that superior court’s decision
was based on a misunderstanding of the Development Authorities
Clause 84 of the Georgia Constitution. 85 The superior court’s rationale
was based on its understanding that the Development Authorities
Clause requires that “the terms of conditions of the bonds issued by the
development authorities must be uniform,” and its assumption that
bonds issued under subparagraph (6)(N) will have varying terms and
conditions that would be inconsistent with the uniformity required
under the Development Authorities Clause. 86 The court explained that
the superior court misunderstood the uniformity provision, because the
Development Authorities Clause, by its plain terms, requires “the
creation of development authorities under ‘uniform terms and
conditions.’” 87 In sum, the court held that bonds issued by the
development authorities for different projects with different terms and
conditions may be issued pursuant subparagraph (6)(N) and that the
superior court erred in concluding that subparagraph (6)(N) was
unconstitutional. 88

Id.
Id. at 377–78, 829 S.E.2d at 162 (quoting Haney, 271 Ga. at 408, 519 S.E.2d at 669).
82 Id. at 378, 829 S.E.2d at 162.
83 Id.
84 GA. CONST. art. IX, § 6, para. 3.
85 Development Authority of Cobb County, 306 Ga. at 378, 829 S.E.2d at 162.
86 Id. at 379, 829 S.E.2d at 162–63.
87 Id. at 379, 829 S.E.2d at 163. (emphasis in original)
88 Id.
80
81
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In C.W. v. Department of Human Services, 89 the Georgia Court of
Appeals propounded a limit on the Division of Family and Children
Services’ (DFCS) authority to place a parent’s name in the central child
abuse registry for prenatal use of marijuana. 90 After being placed on the
child abuse registry by DFCS based on its determination that C.W. had
committed child abuse while pregnant by using a controlled substance,
C.W. petitioned for a hearing pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 49-5-183(c). 91
While THC was found in C.W.’s newborn daughter’s meconium, DFCS’
evidence substantiating C.W.’s placement on the child abuse registry
was based on C.W.’s marijuana use. 92 Given this and the plain language
of the statutes at issue, an administrative law judge determined that
“marijuana is not a controlled substance, so a mother’s use of marijuana
while pregnant does not amount to prenatal abuse.” 93 After DFCS
appealed to the superior court, the superior court reversed the
administrative law judge’s decision based on the fact that, under
O.C.G.A. § 16-13-21(4), 94 THC is a controlled substance. 95 Thereafter,
C.W. filed for discretionary appeal. 96
On appeal, it is notable that C.W. and DFCS took the same position,
on account of DFCS admitting that C.W. was correct in arguing that
marijuana use does not constitute “prenatal abuse” under O.C.G.A.
§ 15-11-2 97 because marijuana is not a controlled substance as defined
in O.C.G.A. § 16-13-21. 98 On this point, the court noted that “a drug is a
‘controlled substance’ as defined in O.C.G.A. § 16-13-21 only if it is
listed as such in both Georgia and federal schedules.” 99 Given this and
the fact that Georgia does not list marijuana in its schedules, the court
held that “a mother’s use of marijuana while pregnant does not amount
to prenatal abuse.” 100 Applying this rationale to the superior court’s
decision, the court reversed after noting that there was no evidence on
which the superior court could have based its finding that C.W. exposed
her newborn daughter to the controlled substance THC because Georgia
law distinguishes marijuana from THC. 101 Elaborating on this point,
353 Ga. App. 360, 836 S.E.2d 836 (2019).
Id.
91 Id. at 360–61, 836 S.E.2d at 836–37; O.C.G.A. § 49-5-183(c) (2019).
92 Id. at 361, 836 S.E.2d at 837.
93 Id.
94 O.C.G.A. § 16-13-21(4) (2020).
95 C.W., 353 Ga. App. at 361, 836 S.E.2d at 837.
96 Id.
97 O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2 (2019).
98 C.W., 353 Ga. App. at 361–62, 836 S.E.2d at 837; O.C.G.A. § 16-13-21 (2019).
99 Id. at 362, 836 S.E.2d at 837 (emphasis in original).
100 Id.
101 Id. at 362, 836 S.E.2d at 837–38.
89
90
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the court noted that there “was no evidence that C.W. used any drug
other than marijuana, such as synthetic THC, that could have resulted
in the presence of THC” in C.W.’s daughter’s meconium. 102 Given the
above, the court reversed the superior court’s decision, which had
reinstated DFCS’ decision to list C.W.’s name on the central child abuse
registry. 103
V. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
In Georgia Department of Community Health v. Emory University, 104
the Georgia Court of Appeals revisited the issue of whether the
Certificate of Need was required. 105 Specifically, the question was
whether a university hospital could severe its CON for a sixteen-bed
comprehensive in-patient rehabilitation program from its hospital
license and transfer both the program and CON to a separately licensed
facility, such that the facility did not have to seek prior CON
approval. 106 The Commissioner of the Georgia Department of
Community Health determined that the facility was required to obtain
its own CON for the sixteen additional beds it sought to acquire from
the hospital; the Superior Court of DeKalb County disagreed. 107 The
trial court found that no prior CON approval was needed because the
facility’s acquisition of the hospital’s rehabilitation program was the
equivalent of acquiring a health care facility. 108 On appeal, the
Department argued, and the court of appeals agreed, that the trial
court’s order conflicted with the plain language of Georgia’s CON
statute and the administrative regulations promulgated thereunder. 109
First, the court of appeals examined the relevant language of
Georgia’s CON statute:
A certificate of need shall be valid only for the defined scope, location,
cost, service area, and person named in an application . . . unless
such certificate of need owned by an existing health care facility is
transferred to a person who acquires such existing facility. In such
case, the certificate of need shall be valid for the person who acquires

Id. at 362, 836 S.E.2d at 838.
Id.
104 351 Ga. App. 257, 830 S.E.2d 628 (2019).
105 Id. at 257, 830 S.E.2d at 629–30.
106 Id. at 257–58, 830 S.E.2d at 629–30.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 260, 830 S.E.2d at 631.
109 Id. at 258, 830 S.E.2d at 630.
102
103
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such a facility and for the scope, location, cost, and service area
approved by [the Department of Community Health or DCH]. 110

The court of appeals observed that the trial court erred in relying
only on the above-italicized language in the statute. 111 When examining
the CON statute as a whole, including the definition of a “health care
facility,” the court made clear that the definition “does not encompass a
specialized program operated by and within a licensed health care
facility, such as a hospital.” 112 Thus, given the statutory definition of a
“health care facility,” the court of appeals held that treating the
hospital’s program as a health care facility, as the Department
determined in its prior opinion letters, “violated the plain language of
the CON statute and therefore exceeded DCH’s authority.” 113
Significantly, the court of appeals noted it was “not bound by any DCH
determination that [the hospital’s] program, standing alone,
constitute[d] a health care facility.” 114 Moreover, examining the
controlling plain language of O.C.G.A. § 31-6-40(a)(4)—which requires a
CON for “any increase in the bed capacity of a health care facility”—the
court of appeals concluded that the facility must obtain a CON to add
sixteen additional beds to its program. 115
In Moosa Company, LLC v. Commissioner of Ga. Department of
Revenue, 116 the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
whether a specific statute dictates the appellate procedure available to
a tobacco retailer, Moosa Company, LLC (Moosa). 117 Moosa disputed a
tobacco tax assessment by the Commissioner of the Georgia
Department of Revenue before the Georgia Tax Tribunal. The Tribunal
dismissed Moosa’s appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which
was affirmed by the Superior Court of Fulton County. The court of
appeals granted Moosa’s application for discretionary review. 118
On appeal, Moosa contended that the trial court’s finding resulted
from its “exercise of flawed statutory construction.” 119 The court of

110 Id. at 263–64, 830 S.E.2d at 633–34 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 31-6-41(a) (2020) (emphasis
in original)).
111 Id. at 264, 830 S.E.2d at 634.
112 Id. at 265, 830 S.E.2d at 634.
113 Id. at 266, 830 S.E.2d at 635.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 267, 830 S.E.2d at 635–36 (emphasis omitted).
116 353 Ga. App. 429, 838 S.E.2d 108 (2020).
117 Id. at 429, 838 S.E.2d at 109.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 430, 838 S.E.2d at 110.
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appeals disagreed. 120 The court of appeals began its analysis “with
familiar and binding canons of construction”:
When we consider the meaning of a statute, we must presume that
the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant. To
that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary
meaning, we must view the statutory text in the context in which it
appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and
reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language
would. We must also seek to avoid a construction that makes some
language mere surplusage. Further, when the language of a statute
is plain and susceptible of only one natural and reasonable
construction, courts must construe the statute accordingly. 121

With these canons in mind, the court of appeals examined the
relevant statute governing taxes on tobacco products, which provides
that “[a]ny person aggrieved because of any final action or decision of
the commissioner, after hearing, may appeal from the decision to the
superior court of the county in which the appellant resides.” 122 The court
of appeals explained that the language in the statute “is clear and
unambiguous in its identification of the forum available to tobacco
taxpayers for appeal—the superior court of the county in which the
taxpayer resides.” 123 The court found no need, therefore, to address any
of the other canons of construction. 124
Nonetheless, Moosa contended that other Georgia statutes, O.C.G.A.
§§ 48-2-59 125 and 50-13A-9, 126 “authorize the Tribunal to exercise
jurisdiction over the Commissioner’s final decision concerning a tobacco
tax.” 127 Rejecting that argument, the court of appeals followed clear
case precedent that “for purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific
statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a
contrary legislative intent in the relevant statutory text.” 128 The court
recognized that the specific statute governing tobacco tax appeals
prevailed over the general jurisdictional statutes concerning the
Tribunal. 129
Id.
Id. at 430–31, 838 S.E.2d at 110 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
122 Id. at 431, 838 S.E.2d at 110 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 48-11-18(b) (2020)) (emphasis
added).
123 Id.
124 Id. at 432, 838 S.E.2d at 111.
125 O.C.G.A. § 48-2-59 (2020).
126 O.C.G.A. § 50-13A-9 (2020).
127 Moosa Company, LLC, 353 Ga. App. at 432, 838 S.E.2d at 111.
128 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
129 Id.
120
121
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Finally, the court of appeals was not convinced by Moosa’s argument
that another statute, O.C.G.A. § 50-13A-2, 130 demonstrated contrary
“legislative intent” for the Tribunal’s general jurisdictional statute to
prevail over the specific provisions of § 48-11-18(b). 131 Notably, the
court of appeals emphasized the General Assembly’s decision not to
amend the specified appellate procedure codified in § 48-11-18 “so as to
broaden the scope of appellate forums available to tobacco
taxpayers.” 132 Absent such amended language, Moosa’s “legislative
intent” argument failed. The court of appeals concluded that “the
general intention behind the creation of the Tribunal does not permit
this Court to ignore the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 48-11-18
concerning the designated appellate forum available to tobacco
taxpayers.” 133
VI. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Henry County Board of Education v. Rutledge, 134 the Georgia
Court of Appeals reversed the superior court’s decision to vacate the
State Board of Workers’ Compensation (the Board) denial of Rutledge’s
claim for workers’ compensation benefits. 135 In 2014, Rutledge was a
sixty-nine-year-old bus driver who “passed out” when he noticed smoke
or steam was coming out of the dash of his bus while he was warming
up the air brakes. 136 After being taken to the hospital, it was
determined that Rutledge had suffered a stroke. Rutledge and his
employer took different positions on Rutledge’s stroke, with Rutledge
arguing that “his exposure to smoke on the bus was either an
aggravating factor or precipitating cause of this stroke,” and his
employer arguing that the stroke was caused by factors unrelated to
this job. 137 An administrative law judge (ALJ) found at a hearing that
Rutledge “suffered from hypertension, was a diabetic, and for a month
prior to his stroke was unable to check his glucose due to his monitor
being broken.” 138
Noting that this case had a complicated procedural history, the court
detailed how Rutledge’s claim twice made its way to the superior court
on appeals from the Board. At the outset, the ALJ, finding that
O.C.G.A. § 50-13A-2 (2020).
Moosa Company, LLC, 353 Ga. App. at 433, 838 S.E.2d at 111.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 433, 838 S.E.2d at 112.
134 354 Ga. App. 643, 839 S.E.2d 684 (2020).
135 Id. at 643, 839 S.E.2d at 685.
136 Id., 839 S.E.2d at 686.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 644, 839 S.E.2d at 686.
130
131
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preponderance of the evidence indicated that, while Rutledge suffered a
stroke while on a school bus, the stroke was not caused by Rutledge
being on the bus. While the Board adopted the ALJ’s decision, the
superior court found the ALJ’s analysis lacking insofar as it “only
considered whether the stroke was caused by Rutledge being on the bus
and not also whether ‘being on the bus contributed to or worsened his
stroke,’” and remanded the case back to the Board for application of the
appropriate causation standard. 139
The Board then remanded to the ALJ for an inquiry in to whether
Rutledge’s injury was the result of aggravation of a preexisting
condition “arising out of and in the course of employment.” 140 On
remand, the ALJ found, despite conflicting evidence, Rutledge’s claim
was compensable because Rutledge met his burden in showing “that his
work duties and an incident at work significantly contributed to his
medical problems on the date of the incident.” 141 Rutledge’s employer
appealed the ALJ’s award to the Board, which disagreed with the ALJ,
vacated its award, and denied Rutledge’s claim. The Board based its
decision on its findings that the record was “equivocal, inconclusive,
conflicting, and insufficient to show causation of an aggravation injury
by a preponderance of the evidence.” 142 Rutledge appealed the Board’s
decision to the superior court, which again “vacated the Board’s decision
and remanded the case ‘for a specific finding as to whether aggravation
of injury did exist.’” 143
Rutledge’s employer appealed, arguing that, when the Board
determined “Rutledge’s exposure to the substance on the bus did not
contribute to or worsen his stroke,” it applied the proper legal
standard. 144 In order for a stroke to be compensable under the Workers’
Compensation Act, 145 an employee must show “by a preponderance of
competent and credible evidence” that his work was a “contributing
factor” to the stroke. 146 In evaluating whether an employee’s work
contributed to their stroke, 147 the Board may consider whether only preId.
Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 645, 839 S.E.2d at 686.
145 O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 (2019).
146 Henry County Board of Education, 354 Ga. App. at 645, 839 S.E.2d at 686–87.
147 While the court of appeals’ opinion phrases the Board’s evaluation in terms of an
employee’s heart attack and points out that most case law interpreting the relevant
statute, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4), focuses on heart attacks, the court also notes that there is
no legal distinction between heart attacks and strokes under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4). Id. at
645 n.2, 839 S.E.2d at 687 n.2.
139
140
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existing risk factors were the cause, or whether any job-related
conditions aggravated said risk factors to cause the stroke. 148 The court
noted that this is a difficult line to find, but that, “[o]nce the Board has
found that line, we must affirm if there is any evidence to support the
Board’s determination.” 149 Applying this rationale, the court found that,
because the Board “analyzed Rutledge’s claim under the framework of
whether his exposure on the bus contributed to or aggravated his
injury,” the Board applied the appropriate legal framework. 150 Because
the Board applied the appropriate legal framework, the court concluded
that the superior court erred in vacating the Board’s decision. 151
In Burch v. STF Foods, Inc., 152 the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed
a superior court order that affirmed the Appellate Division of the State
Board of Workers’ Compensation (the Board) application of the “any
evidence” standard in evaluating Burch’s workers’ compensation
claim. 153 In January 2013, Burch, an employee at a Wendy’s fast food
restaurant, “injured his upper back while attempting to move a stock
pot full of chili,” and “[injured his] upper back/shoulder area after trying
to lift a trash bag into a dumpster.” 154 After Burch aggravated his
injuries at work twice in 2013, he was given instructions not to lift
anything unless he was given permission to do so by a member of
management. Despite these instructions, Burch continued to lift items,
which resulted in in his termination for insubordination. Following his
termination, Burch filed a workers’ compensation claim seeking
temporary partial disability (TPD) from January 21, 2013, the date of
his second injury in January 2013, through December 19, 2013, the date
of his termination, temporary total disability (TTD) from December 20,
2013, onward, and medical expenses. 155
At the hearing on his claim, the administrative law judge (ALJ)
found his employer responsible for Burch’s medical expenses related to
incidents at work in January and November 2013, but rejected Burch’s
claim for TPD benefits from the time of January 21, 2013, injury until
his termination on the basis that Burch continued to work following his
work-related accidents and that his weekly wage increased during that

Id. at 645, 839 S.E.2d 687.
Id. (quoting Phillips Correctional Institute v. Yarbrough, 248 Ga. App. 693, 695, 548
S.E.2d 424, 426 (2001)).
150 Id. at 645, 839 S.E.2d at 687.
151 Id. at 645–46, 839 S.E.2d at 687.
152 353 Ga. App. 172, 836 S.E.2d 573 (2019).
153 Id. at 172, 836 S.E.2d at 574.
154 Id. at 173, 836 S.E.2d at 575.
155 Id.
148
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period. 156 Interestingly, while the ALJ also “found that the ‘main
reason’ for Burch’s termination was his insubordination, namely
Burch’s refusal to heed his supervisor’s instructions to avoid lifting at
his workplace,” the ALJ determined that the instructions from his
supervisor arose from Burch’s restricted work capacity caused by his
previous on-the-job accidents and that Burch ceased work and became
disabled because of his work injuries. 157 Based on this and medical
reports, the ALJ determined that Burch was entitled to TTD benefits
from December 20, 2013, onward. 158
After Burch’s employer appealed this decision to the Board, the
Board upheld the ALJ’s award of medical benefits but reversed the
award of TTD benefits on the rationale that the ALJ “erred in finding
that a relationship between Burch’s work-related injuries and his
stopping work on December 19, 2013, was conclusive as to whether
Burch carried his burden of proving disability.” 159 The result of this was
that the Board found Burch had “failed to prove that any loss of earning
capacity was attributable to this compensable work injuries.” 160 On
Burch’s appeal to the superior court, it affirmed the Board’s decision,
“noting that there was ‘sufficient, competent evidence in the record to
support the Board’s findings.’” 161
On appeal to the court of appeals, Burch argued that he was entitled
to TTD benefits because the Board ought not have reversed the ALJ’s
“finding that he was terminated for reasons connected to his work
injury.” 162 The court disagreed, noting that, with respect to workers’
compensation claims, the employee must prove that he “sustained a
disabling injury arising out of and in the course of his employment,”
and that an employee is entitled to total disability benefits “if the
employee can show by a preponderance of credible evidence that he or
she has experienced a loss of earning capacity due to the injury and not
due to the employee’s unwillingness to work or to economic conditions of
unemployment.” 163 In reviewing the findings of the ALJ and Board, the
court noted that the ALJ tied Burch’s termination to his work injury,
while the Board reversed the ALJ after finding the “preponderance of
the competent and credible evidence” showed the proximate cause of

Id. at 174, 836 S.E.2d at 575.
Id.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 174, 836 S.E.2d at 575–76.
160 Id. at 174, 836 S.E.2d at 576.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 175, 836 S.E.2d at 576 (quoting Dasher v. City of Valdosta, 217 Ga. App. 351,
352–53, 457 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1995)).
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Burch’s termination was not his injuries or the need for light duty, but
rather for disobeying the instructions put in place to accommodate his
injury. 164
In reviewing the Board’s decision, the court applied the following
standard of review:
[W]hen the Board reviews an ALJ’s grant or denial of workers’
compensation benefits, the Board is authorized to vacate an ALJ’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law as unsupported by a
preponderance of the competent and credible evidence, and to
substitute its own alternative findings. And in so doing, the Board is
also authorized to assess witness credibility, weigh conflicting
evidence, and draw different factual conclusions from those reached
by the ALJ who initially heard the dispute . . . . In stark contrast,
however, neither this Court nor the superior court has any authority
to substitute itself as a factfinding body in lieu of the Board. Indeed,
as a reviewing court, our role is not to return to the findings of the
ALJ and examine whether that decision was supported by a
preponderance of the evidence, but is instead to review the Board’s
award for the sole purpose of determining if whether its findings are
supported by any record evidence. If this Court answers that
question in the affirmative, the Board’s findings are conclusive and
binding, regardless of whether we would have reached the same
result if given the opportunity to weigh the evidence in the first
instance. 165

In applying this standard of review, the court noted that neither it
nor the superior court is permitted to “substitute itself as a factfinding
body in lieu of the Board” and that it would affirm if the Board’s
“findings are supported by any record evidence.” 166 Looking to the
record, the court stated there was ample evidence to support the
Board’s determination that insubordination was the proximate cause of
Burch’s firing, namely that he was instructed via writing and in a
meeting to not lift anything and his separation notice explicitly stated
Burch was terminated for insubordination for not following said
instructions. 167 In sum, in applying the “any evidence standard,” the
court of appeals found that there was evidence in record to support the
Board’s finding. 168

Id. at 175, 836 S.E.2d at 576.
Id. at 175–76, 836 S.E.2d at 576–77 (quoting Emory Univ. v. Duval, 330 Ga. App.
663, 665–67, 768 S.E.2d 832, 834–35 (2015) (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
166 Id. at 176, 836 S.E.2d at 577 (quoting Emory Univ., 330 Ga. App. at 666, 768 S.E.2d
at 835).
167 Id. at 176–77, 836 S.E.2d at 577.
168 Id. at 177, 836 S.E.2d at 577.
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